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Today's Evidence
THREAT
CONSTRUCTION KRITIK 1NC SHELL
A. THE THEORY OF THREAT CONSTRUCTION
B. THE LINK. - THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSTRUCTS A POTENTIAL ENEMY IN A THREATENING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.
C. IMPACTS.
C1.
UNDERMINES THE CASE - SINCE THE CASE HARMS ARE CONSTRUCTED RATHER THAN REAL,
THERE IS NO ADVANTAGE.
A1. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IS CONSTRUCTED
Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics, University of California-Santa Cruz, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p.10.
Security is, to put Waever's argument in other words, a socially constructed
concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. It
emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to
reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. To be
sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions
regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of
which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and
social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is
"out there." But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a
material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they
cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality
independent of these constructions. That security is socially constructed does
not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to
create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are
irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying
security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the
projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their
relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these
projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words,
nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their
targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles
might do to us with theirs.
A2. CONSTRUCTED THREATS EVENTUALLY BECOME REAL
Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics, University of California-Santa Cruz, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p.9.
Yet, according to Der Derian, describing how the solitary computer wargaming of
the Iraqi and American militaries were literally joined together in battle on
the deserts of the Persian Gulf littoral, hyperreal threats do sometimes have an
odd way of becoming material. The Gulf War created a "real"
simulation, broadcast to the watching billions, that was later found out to have
been a less-than-accurate representation. This does not mean that those who died
suffered simulated deaths. Simulated threats may be imagined, but their ultimate
consequences are all too real.
A3. WHEN THREATS ARE NO LONGER CONSTRUCTED, THERE IS NO SECURITY PROBLEM
Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics, University of California-Santa Cruz, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p.224.
Nuclear deterrence depended on lines on the ground and in the mind: To be
secure, one had to believe that, were the Other to cross the line, both the self
and the Other would cease to exist. The threat of nothingness secured the
ontology of being, but at great political cost to those who pursued this
formula. Since 1991, deterrence has ceased to wield its cognitive force, and the
lines in the mind and on the ground have vanished, in spite of repeated efforts
to draw them anew. To be sure, the United States and Russia do not launch
missiles against each other because both know the result would be annihilation.
But the same is true for France and Britain, or China and Israel. It was the
existence of the Other that gave deterrence its power; it is the disappearance
of the Other that has vanquished that power. Where Russia is now concerned, we
are, paradoxically, not secure, because we see no need to be secured. In other
words, as Ole Waever might put it, where there is no constructed threat, there
is no security problem. France is fully capable of doing great damage to the
United States, but that capability has no meaning in terms of U.S. security.
C2. PERCEIVED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS ARE USED TO CONSTRUCT AN ENEMY OTHER
Anuradha Chenoy, Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 2000, p.22.
National security perceptions and nationalism are instruments which most
political parties use politically, though the degree may vary. Defense budgets
are, thus, high priority items in most regimes, regardless of the parties in
power. Right-wing political parties, based on national chauvinism, often raise a
bogey of national Security threat to mobilize popular support and generate mass
consciousness with a view to building a homogenized community of citizens, ready
to pit itself against some "other" community, domestic or foreign,
which is perceived as an enemy.
C3. WMD IS INCREASINGLY CONSTRUCTED AS A THREAT
David Mutimer, Professor of International Relations, Keele University, CRITICAL
SECURITY STUDIES, Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds., 1997, p.188-9.
Krauthammer's article appeared as a United States-led coalition was using Iraq
as a test range for its assortment of weapons of all kinds of destruction. The
aftermath, of this war in the Gulf saw the West pick up the pace of their
realization that longer-term action was needed to address the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the massive conventional army that
Iraq deployed (admittedly to little effect) was seen to tie conventional weapons
to this new security agenda. Proliferation thus came to be seen as a
wide-ranging problem, encompassing not only the spread of nuclear weapons, but
of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the diffusion of conventional
arms. Not only did Krauthammer sound the warning on proliferation, but he also
foresaw the elements of a response to this new threat, a response that would be
developed by the West in the years following the Gulf War.
C4. TURNS THE CASE SECURITY DISCOURSE AND POLICY CREATE MORE INSECURITY
Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics, University of California-Santa Cruz, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p.220.
The chapters by Dan Deudney and Pearl-Alice Marsh remind us just how problematic
it can be to discipline wildness and direct tameness, even when, to some, the
world appears to be black and white. Even as nuclear doctrine sought to secure
the United States against the enemy, it threatened the very people it was
intended to protect. And, even as U.S. security policy in southern Africa
promised to protect the home appliances apparently deemed so important to the
American people by its leaders, so, too, did it also raise the possibility of a
cessation in the very mineral flows that made those appliances feasible and
affordable. Contradictory speech acts emerged from this process, undermining
security policy and leaving behind less security, rather than more.
C5. DISCURSIVE IMPACT THE DISCOURSE OF SECURITY IS A SPEECH ACT HAVING REAL EFFE
Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics, University of California-Santa Cruz, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p.213.
The logic, the interpretation and the response together comprise the
"speech act" of security. As Ole Waever has put it, With the help of
language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act. In this
usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more
"real"; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying it,
something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering
"security," a state-representative moves a particular development into
a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are
necessary to block it.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IS INTERSUBJECTIVE, NOT OBJECTIVE
Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics, University of California-Santa Cruz, ON
SECURITY, 1995, p.213.
"Intersubjectivity" among the actors in international relations
includes only the mutually constituted relationship between two actors -- in
terms of the logic of the state system, between potentially hostile states --
but also interpretations of position and responses to interpretations that arise
from the logic of that relationship. In other words, the structure of the system
as it is commonly understood provides the setting within which interpretations
take place. So far, this is not very different from the neo-realist notion that
anarchy and self-help require the state to ensure its own security. What the
condition of intersubjectivity adds to this is the idea that there is nothing
"objective" about this arrangement; it grows out of the mutual
interpretations and responses to one another by the actors constituting the
system.
IDEAS ABOUT THREATS ARE MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN MATERIAL WEAPONS
Alexander Wendt and David Friedman, Professors of Political Science, Yale and
Dartmouth, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Autumn 1995, p.692.
Idealists are not saying that states do not act on the basis of power and
interests but rather that this is contingent on the social structure in which
states are embedded. In a conflictual system power and interests matter, but
what makes a system conflictual is an underlying structure of common knowledge.
The threat posed to the United States by five hundred British nuclear weapons is
less than that posed by five North Korean ones, because the British are friends
and the North Koreans are not, and amity and enmity are social, not material,
relations. In that sense it is "ideas all the way down."
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